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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the majority. It is submitted that the wisest position is taken by those
who advocate a compromise agency agreement, where the amounts
charged non-union employees are limited to the actual costs of repre-
sentation."4
DONALD H. Ross
TAXATION OF PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS OF
DECEASED EMPLOYEES
At the time of his death, after forty-two years of service, deceased
was president of a company, drawing an annual salary of 42,000 dollars.
Four days after his death, the board of directors passed a resolution' to
pay his widow the sum of 42,000 dollars in twenty-four semi-monthly
installments. The resolution indicated that the payment was being made
in the best interests of the company, and was made as additional
compensation and in consideration of the services rendered by the
deceased.' The corporation made the payments to the widow, and with-
holding taxes were withheld. The corporation deducted the payments on
its corporate tax returns as employee salary expense. The widow
excluded the payments from her tax return, and the commissioner
54. See North Dakota position, note 49 supra.
1. The resolution was as follows:
"WHEREAS, Martin C. Kuntz, Sr., our beloved brother, who died January 3, 1955,
had completed 42 years of faithful service to The Peter Kuntz Company, and
"WHEREAS, Martin -C. Kuntz, Sr. as President of this company from August 5,
1954 until his death, and prior thereto as executive Vice-President and Secretary, did
direct the affairs of the company in a highly successful manner,
"BE IT RESOLVED, that the directors of the Company hereby record their deep
appreciation for the many contributions of Martin C. Kuntz, Sr., his loyalty, boundless
energy, untiring efforts, excellent judgment and splendid leadership.
"It was moved by Elizabeth K. Wickham, seconded by John J. Kuntz, and-upon
vote unanimously passed, that because of Martin C. Kuntz, Sr.'s service of Forty-Two
(42) years to The Peter Kuntz Co., in an executive capacity, as outlined in the above
Resolution, and because during this entire period until his death he devoted all of his
time, skill and knowledge to the welfare of this corporation; it is to the best interests,
and benefit of the corporation to pay to Isabelle M. Kuntz, the widow of Martin C.
Kuntz, Sr., Deceased, the sum of $42,000.00 which was the amount of his yearly salary
for 1954, payable in twenty-four semi-monthly installments beginning January 15, 1955.
This payment is made as additional compensation and in consideration of services here-
tofore rendered to this corporation by the late Martin C. Kuntz, Sr. as hereinbefore
stated." Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849, 850 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 31
U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1962).
2. A second resolution for the payment of 5,000 dollars to the widow was also
passed, which declared that the sum was not taxable to the recipient under § 101(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Estate of Martin Kuntz, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1531
(1960). The exclusion by the widow of this amount was not being contested. Estate of
Kuntz v. Commissioner, supra at 851.
All sections hereinafter cited will be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, unless otherwise indicated.
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assessed a deficiency based on this exclusion. The Tax Court concluded
that the payments to the widow constituted taxable income to her, and
were not excludable as gifts. On appeal, held, reversed: the Tax Court
was "clearly erroneous" in deciding that the payments did not constitute
gifts. Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1962).
Amounts received by the widow of a deceased employee may be
exempt as a gift under section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,' or may be taxable as compensation for past services of the deceased
employee under section 61.' However, even, where otherwise taxable
under section 61, a partial exclusion is available under section 101 (b).'
Until the early part of 1962, the Internal Revenue Service had
contended that payments to widows of deceased employees were governed
by section 101 (b) 0 (providing for an exclusion of the first 5,000 dollars
of such payments), and that section 102 (providing for exclusion of
gifts) was inapplicable to these payments. In the face of several ad-
verse court decisions,7 the Commissioner abandoned his position, and
admitted that payments to widows of deceased employees might be
excludable under section 102. He stressed, however, that he would
continue to argue that widows' payments generally were not gifts.'
What criteria will be used in determining whether or not payments
to widows are taxable as compensation or excludable as gifts? The most
3. Section 102 pertains to gifts and inheritances, and provides that "Gross income does
not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance."
4. Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived."
5. Section 101(b) concerns employee death benefits, and provides as follows:
"(1) General Rule-Gross income does not include amounts received (whether in
single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee, if
such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid by reason of
the death of the employee.
"(2) (A) $5000 limitation-The aggregate amounts excludable under paragraph (1)
with respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed $5,000.00 .... "
6. Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 32, was based on Technical Information Re-
lease 252 dated September 12, 1960, and stated that the position of the service is that
employees' death benefit payments are controlled by § 101(b) of the code, under which
a maximum of $5,000.00 is excludable from gross income, and that § 102 is inapplicable
to any part of such payments.
7. Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frankel v. United
States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961); Cowan v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Ga. 1960); Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd mem.,
277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
8. Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. -, was based on Technical Information
Release 371 dated March 19, 1962, and stated that the Internal Revenue Service would
no longer contend that § 101(b) applies to limit to $5,000.00 the exclusion from gross
income of an amount paid to the widow of a deceased employee, where the payment
otherwise qualifies as a gift excludable under § 102(a). The Internal Revenue Service
emphasized that it will continue to argue that in extending § 101(b) to non-contractual
payments, Congress assumed that such payments did not qualify as gifts, thereby en-
dorsing the Service's ruling in I.T. 4027, 1950-2 CuM. BuLL. 2, 9, that widow's payments
generally are not gifts.
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recent expression of the Supreme Court in the gift-income determination
area is a trio of cases decided in 1960.9
In Commissioner v. Duberstein,0 the Court held that the intention
of the payor of the gratuity controlled the determination of gift or
income, and that the question of intent was basically one of fact, which('must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's
experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the
facts in each case."' 0 a In so holding, the Court adopted the view of the
dissenting opinion in Bogardus v. Commissioner."
By making the question one of fact, to be decided on a case-by-case
basis, Duberstein places great weight on the findings of the trial court.'2
In federal cases generally, where the trial has been without a jury, the
judge's findings must stand unless "clearly erroneous."' 3
In the case of Poyner v. Commissioner," the Fourth Circuit vacated
the decision of the trial court and remanded it for further proceedings.
The court thereby acknowledged its limited power as a fact-finding
tribunal, citing Duberstein. On stipulated facts, similar to those in Kuntz,
the Tax Court found "compensation." The appeals court in Poyner did
not agree with the Tax Court's conclusion, but stated that there might
have been additional factors which were not brought out in the trial.
The reluctance to disturb the Tax Court's findings was apparent, how-
ever.
In the Kuntz case,'14 the court of appeals decided that the only
reasonable inference from the factual pattern was that the payment was
a gift. The court held:
1. That the characterization by the Board of Directors was not
controlling-there was testimony that the Board intended a gift.
2. That the widow was not being compensated.
9. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960); Commissioner v. Duberstein, Stanton
v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
10. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). In the two years since this decision was handed down, it
has been cited in more than fifty cases.
10a. Id. at 289.
11. 302 U.S. 34 (1937). The Supreme Court in this case split 5-4. The majority held
that determination of whether a payment constituted compensation or a tax-free gift was
a conclusion of law, or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact.
12. In tax cases, the taxpayer chooses the forum. He may refuse to pay the assess-
ment, and argue his case in the Tax Court where there is no jury, or he may pay the
assessment and sue for a refund in a federal district court where he may request a jury.
Because Duberstein places such importance on the findings of fact in the trial court, it is
usually better to litigate via the district court, since juries are prone to be moved by
sympathy for the widow, and find a "gift."
13. Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951); Life
Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950); Young v. United States,
111 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1940) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
13a. 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
14. Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962).
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3. That the company expected no economic benefit (even though
the resolution stated that the payment was made "in the best
interests of the company").
4. That the deceased had been fully compensated during his life-
time.
5. That the payment was motivated by sympathy, generosity and
kindness to the widow.
It is questionable whether the court, in light of the mandate in
Duberstein, was justified in reversing the trial court. The record dis-
closes that there was evidence on which the Tax Court could have based
its findings of fact (i.e., the resolution of the Board of Directors).
An approach more in line with Duberstein was followed in the
Poyner case. By vacating and remanding instead of reversing, the court
left the basic responsibility for fact-finding where Duberstein put it-in
the trial court.
Perhaps the Duberstein "case-by-case" approach is the best possible
procedure in the gift-income area generally. On the other hand, refusal
of the Supreme Court to lay down definite standards has led to widely
divergent results in similar fact situations.15 For example, in Kuntz, the
Sixth Circuit found that "the payment was motivated by sympathy,
generosity, and kindness to the widow" (which would ordinarily indicate a
gift). The opinion fails to disclose specific grounds for this conclusion,
and the trial court found that this was not the motive. Compare this
result with another recent case, 6 where the court found that the payment
was not motivated by sympathy for the widow, even though she was an
invalid with high medical bills, suffered from arthritis and Parkinson's
disease, and had to use a wheelchair.
While the "case-by-case" approach may be the best test in the gift-
income area generally, perhaps a separate set of rules should be developed
for payments falling in the "employer payment to widow" category. 17
15. For recent cases finding gift see United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1962); Estate of Olsen v. Com-
missioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1962).
For recent cases finding compensation see Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1962); Martin v. Commissioner,
305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1962); Gaugler
v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Estate of Rosen, 62 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 363 (1962); Margaret H. D. Penick, 37 T.C. 98 (1962).
16. Margaret H. D. Penick, supra note 15.
17. Although the Duberstein decision (note 9 supra) has been cited in almost every
"gift to widow" case, the facts in that case did not concern widows at all. Duberstein
had gratuitously supplied a business acquaintance with leads to customers. The leads
proved fruitful; in gratitude, the acquaintance gave Duberstein a Cadillac. The Court
affirmed a finding that the gratuity was taxable.
The Stanton case (decided in the same opinion as Duberstein) involved payments to
a church official upon his retirement. The trial court found a gift, and the Second Circuit
reversed. 268 F.2d 727. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, since the
1962]
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Since the government has unsuccessfully sought review by the Supreme
Court to settle the conflict among circuits (as to results),l8 new legislation
would appear to be the best solution. 19
One approach would be to tax the widow when the payment:
1. Is based on services rendered by the deceased,
2. Would not have arisen had there not been the employer-employee
relationship, and
3. Is claimed by the employer as a business expense.20
Where these requirements are not met, the payment should be tax-
free.
CLAUDE L. EICHEL
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFER OF APPRECIATED
PROPERTY IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
In 1954, the taxpayer and his then spouse entered into a voluntary
property settlement and separation agreement. The agreement provided
for support payments and the transfer of certain personal property to the
wife, and was later incorporated into the divorce decree. One-half of the
property involved in the settlement, represented by five hundred shares
trial court merely had found "gift" without stating the determining facts or legal standard
involved in its decision. 363 U.S. 278, 292. Upon remand, the trial court found a gift
again, this time setting forth in detail the reasons for its conclusions. 186 F. Supp. 393
(E.D.N.Y. 1960). The circuit affirmed finding the verdict not "clearly erroneous." 287
F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1961).
18. The Supreme Court denied writs of certiorari simultaneously in the instant case,
and the Olsen, Frankel, Smith, and Martin cases (supra note 15). Chief Justice Warren
was of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted. 31 U.S.L. Week 4116 (U.S.
Nov. 8, 1962).
19. The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960),
suggested: "If there is fear of undue uncertainty or overmuch litigation, Congress may
make more precise its treatment of the matter by singling out certain factors and making
them determinative of the matter."
20. The Revenue Act of 1962 added § 274(b) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
This section provides that no deduction shall be allowed (as a business expense) for gifts
in excess of $25 to any individual during a taxable year. For purposes of the section,
"gift" means any item excludable from the gross income of the recipient under § 102.
Applying this new section to the "gifts to widows" area would seem to limit the
employer's deduction to $5,025, since $5000 would be excludable to the widow under
§ 101(b) (to which § 274(b) does not apply), and the balance would fall within the
$25 limitation.
Of course, the employer could take the position of the Internal Revenue Service in
Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962-2 Cum. BULL-that payments to widows are generally not gifts,
and that the payment is not excludable to the widow under § 102.
Where the employer can establish an intent not to make a gift to the widow in order
to obtain a deduction for the payment, it would seem that the widow is out of luck as
far as the possibility of excluding the payment from her income under § 102, since the
law is that the intent of the payor determines the character of the payment. Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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